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Abstract Amie Thomasson and Eli Hirsch have both attempted to deflate meta-
physics, by combining Carnapian ideas with an appeal to ordinary language. My
main aim in this paper is to critique such deflationary appeals to ordinary language.
Focussing on Thomasson, I draw two very general conclusions. First: ordinary lan-
guage is a wildly complicated phenomenon. Its implicit ontological commitments
can only be tackled by invoking a context principle; but this will mean that ordinary
language ontology is not a trivial enterprise. Second: ordinary language often points
in different directions simultaneously, so that a wide variety of existence questions
cannot be deflated merely by appealing to ordinary language.
Keywords Deflationary metaphysics · Ordinary language · Easy ontology ·
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1 Thomasson’s easy ontology
Thomasson wants to deflate existence questions. She attempts to do so, not by dis-
missing them as nonsensical, but by providing them with easy answers. I shall begin
by outlining some of Thomasson’s model questions and answers.1
1 Thomasson (2009b, pp. 8–12, 2013, pp. 1025–1027, 2015, pp. 37, 102–103, 106–107, 129–153, 258,
2016, Sect. 1, forthcoming, Sect. 1). Thomasson, of course, notes that plenty of existence questions
require serious empirical work, e.g. ‘are there faster-than-light neutrinos?’ However, such questions
are not the concern of this paper. I shall not repeat this caveat in what follows, but it holds throughout.
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Are there properties? The answer is easy. Just consider the following argument:
(1p) that rug is red
(2p) that rug has the property of being red
(3p) there are properties
Here, (1p) is supposed to be given to us fairly directly, (2p) is supposed to follow from
(1p), and then (3p) from (2p).
Are there propositions? The answer is as easy as before:
(1t) Tillman is a bulldog
(2t) the proposition that Tillman is a bulldog is true
(3t) there are propositions
Are there numbers? Again, the answer is easy:
(1n) there are four bagels
(2n) the number of bagels is four
(3n) there are numbers
Are there events? Obviously:
(1e) she was born on Monday
(2e) her birth—an event—occurred on Monday
(3e) there are events
Such easy-arguments can be multiplied, but the idea is clear enough. We start by
posing some existence question. Thomasson offers an easy-argument in reply. And so
Thomasson’s easy ontology aims to suck the life out of debating existence questions.
What are the options, if we want to resist the conclusion of these easy-arguments?
Indeed: what are the options, if we just want to say that easy-arguments are too easy?
It seems futile to deny the inputs, i.e. the various (1)s. Even if Tillman is not a
bulldog, but rather a truly enormous pug, essentially the same argument as (1t)–(3t)
will go through. Indeed, to block any possible input to Thomasson’s easy-argument
for the existence of propositions, we would have to abandon the entire practice of
making assertions. And that is hardly a live option.
So, if we want to disagree with Thomasson’s conclusions or methods, we will have
to contest the inferential steps in her easy-arguments. But Thomasson thinks that this
is also hopeless. For, according to Thomasson, our ordinary ways of talking are such
as to make the inferential steps obviously justified. At which point, the only way to
contest the inferential steps is to propose an alternative way of speaking; one which
does not license such inferences.
This leads Thomasson to draw the following conclusion:
If we ask a general existence question such as ‘are there numbers?’, ‘are there
properties’, ‘are there propositions’, using those terms in the only sense they
have—using the rules by which they are introduced into the language, the answer
is a straightforward, easy ‘yes’. If we are spoiling for a debate, wemust undertake
it on other territory: regarding whether we should use these terms, along with
their customary rules of use, at all.2
2 Thomasson (2015, p. 41, 2016, p. 14; her emphasis). See also Thomasson (2015, pp. 39–40, 73, 77–78,
112, 153, 169). Thomasson describes her position as Carnapian. I shall not explore the link to Carnap, but
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My main interest here is in Thomasson’s explicit invocation of ordinary language.
Thomasson both assumes that the existence questions are (typically) being asked in
ordinary language, and also argues that the transition rules used in the easy-arguments
are analytic, grammatical, conceptual, or trivial rules of ordinary language.3 So, by
investigating Thomasson’s deflationary position, I hope to draw some general conclu-
sions concerning what ordinary language can tell us about ontology.
2 Bad easy-arguments and the Context Principle
In this section, I shall show that ordinary language is much more complicated than
Thomasson’s easy-arguments suggest. To do this, I shall consider some bad easy-
arguments. These will force us to reflect on the complexities of ordinary language.
2.1 Bad easy-arguments
Thomasson is well aware that the easy-argument template is not generally valid. To
see this, consider a bad easy-argument:
(1k) rain stopped the cricket match
(2k) rain put the kibosh on the cricket match
(3k) there are kiboshes4
In my ordinary vernacular, (2k) is a literal and legitimate inference to draw from (1k).
But the move to (3k) is wholly illegitimate. And ordinary English supplies us with a
brickload of bad easy-arguments:
(1) I did it for him
(2) I did it for his sake
(3) there are sakes5
(1) you are smart
(2) you have lots of smarts
(3) there are smarts6
Footnote 2 continued
I would emphasise that Thomasson’s invocation of ordinary language is no part of Carnap’s position (cf.
Thomasson 2015, p. 44).
3 In her 2007, Thomasson tended to speak in terms of ‘common sense’. In her 2015, she tends to speak
in terms of ‘ordinary language’, ‘ordinary usage’ or ‘ordinary English’. I do not think much hangs on the
difference, not least since Thomasson (2015, p. 135) is explicit that her earlier ‘defense of ordinary objects’
(i.e. her 2007) was a prototype for her full-fledged programme of easy ontology.
4 Consider also ‘dampener’ in place of ‘kibosh’.
5 Quine (1960, Sect. 4, pp. 48, 50) seems to be the first philosopher to have offered this example; he also
considers ‘behalf’ in place of ‘sake’. Thomasson (2015, p. 265) explicitly considers this easy-argument for
‘sakes’, and I consider her response in Sect. 2.3.
6 Thomasson (2013, pp. 20–21, 2015, pp. 198–200) discusses ‘smarts’ when contrasting her position with
fictionalism, though does not discuss what they tell us about easy-arguments.
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(1) she indicated her disdain for metaphysics
(2) she cocked a snook at metaphysics
(3) there are snooks7
(1) he got jittery
(2) he got the heebie-jeebies
(3) there are heebie-jeebies8
(1) I cheered up
(2) I found my happy
(3) there are happies9
In every case, the transition from (1) to (2) is acceptable in my vernacular, but the tran-
sition to (3) is unlicensed. In what follows, I shall focus on the example of ‘kiboshes’,
but everything I say straightforwardly applies to ‘sakes’, ‘smarts’, ‘snooks’, ‘heebie-
jeebies’, ‘happies’, and the like.
2.2 Applying the Context Principle
If there are bad easy-arguments, then we must ask what separates the good from the
bad. I shall provide my own answer in this section, before considering two alternative
answers in Sect. 2.3.
An obvious thought is that (2k) is nothing but a restatement of (1k).10 Granted, at
a purely syntactic level, one might say that (2k), unlike (1k), involves a three-place
predicate ‘x put y on z’. But treating (2k) as being of that form, in any significant
sense—that is, so that the inference to (3k) is to be regarded as ‘valid in virtue of its
form’—would obviously be a mistake.
Having appreciated this, though, we must revisit all of the easy-arguments which
Thomasson wants to endorse, and ask why we should not say the same thing about
them. I shall start by examining the easy-argument for numbers, and return to the other
easy-arguments in Sect. 2.4.
The easy-argument for numbers requires that we treat (2n) as being (significantly)
of the following form:
term
︷ ︸︸ ︷
the number of bagels
predicate
︷︸︸︷
is
term
︷︸︸︷
four
7 The OED defines ‘snook’ as ‘a derisive gesture’. If that definition is correct, it seems to license the
inference to ‘there are snooks’. However, the only examples of the use of the word ‘snook’ presented in
the OED occur in the context of the phrase ‘cocking a snook’; cf. what I say about the Context Principle in
Sect. 2.2, and my comments on dictionaries in Sect. 3.4.
8 Consider also ‘creeps’ in place of ‘heebie-jeebies’, and see Musgrave (1989, p. 388) on ‘creeps-realism’.
9 Consider also ‘mojo’ in place of ‘happy’. This case raises a further issue: ‘I found my mail’ does not
allow us to infer ‘there are mails’ but ‘there is mail’; so even the crudest syntactic test does not license the
inference from ‘I found my happy’ to ‘there are happies’. Ultimately, though, this is just more grist to my
mill.
10 This is how Thomasson (2013, p. 21, 2015, pp. 199–200) describes the case of ‘smarts’ (see footnote 6,
above). Cf. also Musgrave (1989, p. 388) on ‘creeps’ (see footnote 8, above).
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This will allow us to take the quantificational step to (3n). But, for everything said so
far, we could equally read (2n) as follows:
noun
︷ ︸︸ ︷
bagel
the number of ↓ s is four
︸ ︷︷ ︸
quantifier phrase
which is obviously just a variant of (1n):
noun
︷ ︸︸ ︷
bagel
there are four ↓ s
︸ ︷︷ ︸
quantifier phrase
and which removes the temptation to infer (3n). So, if we want to embrace (1n)–(3n)
as good whilst rejecting (1k)–(3k) as bad, then we face a compulsory question: Why
does ‘the number of bagels’ behave as a genuine term in (2n), whereas ‘the kibosh’
does not so behave in (2k)?
If we consider (2n) and (2k) as isolated sentences, there is really nothing to tell
between them. So, if we are to answer our compulsory question without appealing
to anything beyond ordinary usage, then we must examine the wider practice within
which we say things like (2n). With that in mind, here are some further claims from
that wider practice:
(in) the number of bagels, i.e. four, is the same as the number of people who ate
brunch, and twice the number of packets of lox they consumed
(iin) there are infinitely many even numbers, and four is one of them
(iiin) there are exactly four prime numbers between 0 and 10
If anything makes it legitimate to treat numerical terms like ‘four’ as (purportedly)
referring expressions in ordinary language, then it is the panoply of such claims. That
is why we should admit that ‘four’ genuinely behave as a term in (2n). By contrast,
there are no similar claims concerning ‘kiboshes’, and that is why we should deny that
‘the kibosh’ genuinely behaves as a term in (2k).
I shall say more about this this in the next subsection. But first, it is worth sum-
marising the above point in terms of a general Context Principle. When asking for
the meaning of a phrase, we should neither consider it in isolation, nor merely in the
context of an individual sentence; rather, we must consider it in the context of an entire
practice.11 Then, and only then, can we assess whether an easy-argument is good or
bad.
11 Frege’s Context Principle tells us ‘never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the
context of a proposition’ (1884, p. xxii). Wittgenstein’s Context Principle locates the meaning of a word
within the context of a language game (1953, p. 49). So my formulation of the Context Principle is perhaps
more Wittgenstein than Fregean. Nevertheless, Frege’s and Wittgenstein’s formulations can be linked, by
maintaining that a sentence (considered as a string of words) only expresses a proposition when situated
within a discourse. Davidson (1967, p. 308) seems to have drawn this link explicitly: ‘Frege said that only
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2.3 Ruling out alternative solutions
Bad easy-arguments present a challenge for easy ontology. The Context Principle
provides a solution to that challenge.However, I shall eventually argue that this solution
has some unfavourable consequences for easy ontology. So, before going any further,
I must consider and reject two alternative solutions to the challenge posed by bad
easy-arguments.
One might think that bad easy-arguments merely threaten to show that easy ontol-
ogy has some counter-intuitive consequences. But, if that were the full extent of the
problem, then the easy ontologist could simply maintain that every easy-argument is
good. She would thereby avoid the need to explain what makes an easy-argument good
or bad, at the cost of counter-intuitively countenancing ‘kiboshes’.12
It is vital, then, to understand that counter-intuitiveness is not the issue here. Bad
easy-arguments present a challenge which is less about metaphysics than it is about
language (at least, initially). The essential point is that, even if ‘there are kiboshes’ is
grammatical—which is doubtful—it is totally unclear what it means. There are two
options, and neither is favourable to easy ontology.
The first option is to regard ‘there are kiboshes’ as meaning exactly the same as
‘something stops something’. In that case, we can merrily affirm (3k)—in some mild
expansion of ordinary English—and maintain that it follows from (1k). However,
so understood, we could not also maintain, with a straight face, that (3k) answers the
initially intended existence question.Granted, (3k) is a sentencewhichbegins ‘there are
’, but that tells us very little. The sentence ‘there are kiboshes and carrots’ would be
at best a droll pun; a zeugma, on a par with ‘I pressed my trousers and the point home’.
Consequently, if we want to use (3k) to answer an existence question, we must
maintain that ‘there are kiboshes and carrots’ is on a par with ‘there are cups and
carrots’. This is the second option. But in this case we should be free to ask questions
about the nature of kiboshes, just as we are free to ask questions about cups. So: What
are kiboshes like? When are two kiboshes the same? When the same storm stops two
adjacent cricket matches, do we have two overlapping kiboshes? When is one kibosh
larger than another? And so on. These are all obviously nonsense questions, and with
good reason. Our language only assigns a meaning to the two-place predicate ‘x put
the kibosh on y’, and not to the meaning of the word ‘kibosh’ as a noun in its own
right. So: we can say ‘there are kiboshes’, if we really want to; but we cannot thereby
affirm existence.
In providingmy own solution to the problem of bad easy-arguments in Subsect. 2.2,
I mentioned a Context Principle. This should make us think of Frege, and in fact the
foregoing discussion is really just a variation on a Fregean theme. To make it explicit,
Footnote 11 continued
in the context of a sentence does a word have meaning; in the same vein he might have added that only in
the context of the language does a sentence (and therefore a word) have meaning.’ (Thanks to Rob Trueman
for discussion on this, and for the reference from Davidson).
12 Thanks to Neil Barton and Richard Gaskin for (independently) suggesting that I consider this. Cf.
Thomasson (2015, p. 265n8). In fact, it is implausible to think that all easy-arguments are good, since
there are putative easy-arguments that generate flat-out inconsistency (see Thomasson 2015, pp. 253–72);
however, such arguments are not my concern here.
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recall that Frege considers the idea of simply defining certain numerical expressions
as follows:
the number 0 belongs to F ¬∃x Fx
the number 1 belongs to F ∃x∀y(Fy ↔ x = y)
the number 2 belongs to F ∃x∃y(x = y ∧ ∀z(Fz ↔ (x = z ∨ y = z)))
and so on. But Frege immediately criticises this, pointing out that in this case
we should be unable to justify the expression ‘the number which belongs to the
concept F’…. It is only an illusion that we [would] have defined 0 and 1; in
reality we have only fixed the sense of the phrases:
‘the number 0 belongs to’
‘the number 1 belongs to’
but we have no authority to pick out the 0 and 1 here as self-subsistent objects
that can be recognised as the same again.13
For present purposes, the point is as follows. If you think that all easy-arguments pro-
vide good answers to existence questions, then you have fallen victim to the ‘illusion’
which Frege highlighted.
Everyone, then, must accept that there are bad easy-arguments. And Thomasson
herself accepts this. Moreover, she has her own explanation as to what makes them
bad. Thomasson maintains that bad easy-arguments involve a concept with applica-
13 Frege (1884, p. 56, Frege’s emphasis). One might say, then, that Frege was the first philosopher to
criticise easy-arguments. Indeed, there is a rich history of engagement with such arguments.
Trueman (2014, p. 370n22) suggests that this kind of argument is present in Wittgenstein’s (1931–1934, p.
315) cryptic criticism of Ramsey’s logicism.
Wilfred Sellars (1956, Sects. 8ff.) considers an easy-argument like the following:
(1) the rug appears red to me
(2) the rug presents me with a red sense datum
(3) there are sense data
Sellars agrees that it is fine to infer (2) from (1), provided that you read (2) as a mere variant on (1); however,
that reading bars the inference to (3).
Quine (1960: see footnote 5, above) considers both the easy-argument to ‘sakes’, and also an easy-argument
to the existence of units of measurement, such as:
(1) the race is 26.2 miles long
(2) there are 26.2 miles between the start and the finish of the race
(3) there are miles
Quine rejected such easy-arguments, on the grounds that we are in the presence of ‘defective nouns: they
are normally used only in a limited selection of the usual term positions. Their defectiveness…is easily
exposed in absurd interrogation: Are miles alike? If so, how can they count as many? And if they cannot,
what of the two hundred between Boston and New York?’ (1960, p. 50).
David Lewis (1973, p. 84) presents us with this easy-argument:
(1) things might be otherwise than they are
(2) there is a way things could have been, besides the way they actually are
(3) there exist ways things could have been, i.e. possible worlds
Subject to certain caveats, Lewis suggested that this creates a ‘presumption’ in favour of taking ‘seeming
existential quantifications in ordinary language at their face value’ (1973, p. 84). However, Lewiswas careful
to flag these caveats and, by the time he wrote his 1986, any hint of endorsing this easy-argument had drifted
away; for the whole point of his 1986 is to defend (3) via a lengthy, difficult, cost-benefit analysis. (Thanks
to Mark Sainsbury for drawing my attention to these features of Lewis.).
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tion conditions but with no coapplication conditions. Her point is that we know (for
example) when to apply the concept kibosh, for we know when to utter sentences of
the form ‘x put the kibosh on y’; however, we have no idea when to say whether two
kiboshes are one and the same.14
Thomasson’s reaction to bad easy-arguments evidently has something in common
with my invocation of the Context Principle. After all, both Thomasson and I have
raised difficulties with the idea of saying that two ‘kiboshes’ are the same. However,
my response is importantly different from Thomasson’s. It is not just that we do
not know when to say when two ‘kiboshes’ are the same: we also have no ability to
ostend ‘kiboshes’; to compare ‘kiboshes’; or, indeed, to say anything about ‘kiboshes’.
(Compare and contrast the situation here with the case of numbers, discussed above,
and with what I shall say about events and colours in Subsect. 2.4.) To repeat the
Fregean point: we have only fixed the meaning of the two-place predicate ‘x put the
kibosh on y’. So it is not just that we do not know when to say ‘this kibosh = that
kibosh’; we do not even yet knowwhat such a phrase could mean. Consequently, it is a
mistake to say that there is a monadic concept, kibosh, with application conditions but
without coapplication conditions. There is not yet even a concept of the right shape.
If we do not yet have a monadic concept, kibosh, it is worth asking what it would
take for ordinary language to provide us with such a concept. Given the above, an
obvious suggestion is the following. Suppose that, in addition to all of the sentences
of the form
x put the kibosh on y
we also had a range of sentences of the form
this kibosh = that kibosh
In that case, one might hope that these provide us (respectively) with application and
coapplication conditions for a concept kibosh, so that in a language containing such
sentences we would be able to infer from ‘rain put the kibosh on the cricket match’ to
‘there are kiboshes’ in a way which genuinely affirmed the existence of ‘kiboshes’.
However, developing a point due to Robert Trueman,15 even this is doubtful. So far,
it is only uncontroversial that there are circumstances in which it would be appropriate
to produce sentences of two kinds of shape, both of which happen to contain the ink-
mark ‘kibosh’. However, it is obvious that the ink-mark ‘hat’, as it occurs in ‘this
kibosh = that kibosh’, is not a term which refers to headwear. For similar reasons,
it is debatable whether ‘this kibosh’ genuinely behaves as a term, and whether the
ink-mark ‘=’ genuinely expresses identity, in sentences of the shape ‘this kibosh =
that kibosh’. And, if not, we still cannot affirm the existence of ‘kiboshes’.
14 Thomasson (2015, pp. 264–266). See also Quine (1960, p. 50).
15 Trueman (2014) offers an excellent criticism of neo-logicism, whose core is as follows. The only state-
ments the neo-logicist can work with are those supplied by Hume’s Principle. However, in Thomasson’s
terms, Hume’s Principle aims only to provide us with application and coapplication conditions. Trueman
then argues that these aims are insufficient to introduce us to the concept number. Consequently, Hume’s
Principle fails even to provide us with application or coapplication conditions; it merely pairs up two shapes
of sentences.
This a good point for me to mention that the material in this subsection would certainly not have existed,
had it not been for the many discussions I have had with Rob Trueman over the past few years.
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This prompts a deep question: At what point should we become convinced that an
expression genuinely behaves as a term (in some sentence of some language)? I do not
have a general answer to that question. There will be cases where it is wholly unrea-
sonable to deny that we have a genuine term, cases where it is wholly unreasonable
to maintain that we have a genuine term, and most likely a broad spectrum of cases
in-between. Ordinary language is a wildly complicated phenomenon.
2.4 Not-so-easy ontology
In the previous subsection, I criticised some alternative solutions to the challenge posed
by bad easy-arguments.Henceforth, I shall take it as established that the easy ontologist
must adopt my Context-Principle-based solution, as outlined in Subsect. 2.2. I now
want to explain that my solution comes with a catch: it indicates that ‘easy’ ontology
is something of a misnomer.
The essence of the problem can be stated briefly. Suppose that existence questions
can and should be answered just by reflecting upon ordinary usage. (To be clear:
this supposition is controversial, and I shall ultimately reject it.) Even then, a good
answer along these lines will require a careful examination of the rich variety of ways
in which we ordinarily speak. So, there is no guarantee that existence questions are
easily answerable.
That is the essence of the problem, but it needs refining. For a start: whilst there
is no guarantee that existence questions can be answered straightforwardly, we might
get lucky in certain cases. Indeed, I envisage the following defence of easy ontology:16
Toassess the easy-argument (1n)–(3n), I concede thatwemust invoke theContext
Principle. But this does not yet make ontology difficult. After all, anyone who is
competent in using numerical terms will be equally competent in handling the
claims (in)–(iiin) from Subsect. 2.2. And such claims show that ‘the number of
bagels’ really does behave as a term in (2n). So, on the basis of claims that lie
readily to hand for an ordinary speaker, we can easily see that the easy-argument
(1n)–(3n) is good.
I am sympathetic to this line of thought, in the specific case of numbers. Crucially,
though, this point does not generalise to all of the easy-arguments that Thomasson
endorses. To show this, I shall consider them case-by-case.
The case of events seems broadly comparable to the case of numbers. If anything
demonstrates an ‘ordinary’ commitment to events, it is not (1e), nor (2e), nor any array
of claims of that shape. Rather, it is the wider fact that we are all perfectly prepared
to make claims like these:
(ie) that [pointing] is an exemplary Fosbury Flop
(iie) the First World War and the Great War are one and the same
(iiie) the cricket match and the baseball match started simultaneously, but the former
outlasted the latter by four days, and was rather more exciting
16 Thanks to Peter Hulme for raising this point.
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Respectively, these sentences seem to involve us ostending events, identifying them,
and comparing them in multiple ways.
Initially similar thoughts apply to colours. If anything demonstrates an ‘ordinary’
commitment to colours, then Michael Dummett is surely right that it is our ordinary
willingness to make claims like these:17
(ic) this colour [pointing] is the colour red
(iic) the colour of my rug is the same as the colour of my mug
(iiic) red iswarmer than blue, it is complementary to green, and it lies between orange
and purple
Again, we have apparent ostension, identification and a rich range of comparisons.
However, (ic)–(iiic) are couched in terms of colours, whereas Thomasson’s original
easy-argument, (1p)–(3p), was couched in terms of properties. So if (ic)–(iiic) are to
be used to defend any easy-argument, it will not be the easy-argument (1p)–(3p), but
instead the alternative easy-argument:
(1c) that rug is red
(2c) the colour of that rug is red
(3c) there are colours
Indeed, the case of properties per se (as opposed to colours) turns out to be surpris-
ingly difficult. Thomasson believes that we can always transition from predications to
properties, and so endorses all easy-arguments with this shape:18
(1p′) a is F
(2p′) a has the property of being F
(3p) there are properties
But Dummett gave us excellent reasons to doubt this. Consider this example:19
(1p′′) slobber is slimy
(2p′′) slobber has the property of being slimy
(3p′′) there is a property (of sliminess)
Given the discussion in Subsect. 2.2, if we want to defend this easy-argument, then
we must vindicate this reading of (2p′′):
term
︷ ︸︸ ︷
slobber
predicate
︷︸︸︷
has
term
︷ ︸︸ ︷
the property of being slimy
rather than this alternate reading:
term
︷ ︸︸ ︷
slobber
predicate
︷ ︸︸ ︷
has the property of being
︸ ︷︷ ︸
copula
slimy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
adjective
17 Dummett (1956, pp. 498–501, 1981, pp. 72–80).
18 Thomasson (2015, pp. 234, 258).
19 Dummett (1981, pp. 77–79).
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which can be regarded as a mere variant of (1p′′):
term
︷ ︸︸ ︷
slobber
predicate
︷ ︸︸ ︷
is
︸︷︷︸
copula
slimy
︸ ︷︷ ︸
adjective
If we want to vindicate the first reading, without looking beyond ordinary language,
then we must deploy the Context Principle. But, as Dummett notes, wider practice
does not afford us a rich range of usage for the expression ‘property of being slimy’,
or ‘property of sliminess’. We do not ostend ‘the property of sliminess’, but slimy
things such as slobber.20 We do not make a wide range of identity claims in which the
identifiedobject is ‘the property of sliminess’.Andwe lack a rich rangeof comparatives
concerning ‘the property of sliminess’. Moreover, even if we were to find a vernacular
which treated ‘the property of sliminess’ in a suitably rich sense, we should expect
there to be further subtle variations concerning different predicates, across different
vernaculars, and across different languages. None of this can be settled once and for all,
via a priori means. And none of it can be settled without a huge amount of (linguistic)
effort.
The case of propositions ismuch the same as the case of properties.21 In considering
the argument (1t)–(3t), Thomasson requires that we read (2t) as:
term
︷ ︸︸ ︷
the proposition that Tillman is a bulldog
predicate
︷ ︸︸ ︷
is true
rather than as follows:
sentence
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Tillman is a bulldog
the proposition that ↓ is true
︸ ︷︷ ︸
sentential operator
where the sentential operator is essentially redundant, but might add emphasis, as in
sentence
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Tillman is a bulldog
verily ↓
︸ ︷︷ ︸
sentential operator
To vindicate the first reading, we would need to become convinced that ordinary usage
involves us in (for example) indicating, identifying, and comparing propositions as
20 NB: I am not suggesting that every objectmust be capable of ostension.Mypoint is simply that (apparent)
ostensions can help to convince us that we are genuinely dealing with objects; and whereas we do ostend
colours, we do not ostend the property of sliminess.
21 Which is no surprise, when we regard sentences as 0-place predicates.
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such. And perhaps a careful analysis of ordinary usage might eventually convince
us one way or the other. However, we should expect that analysis to be genuinely
difficult.22
I began this subsection by noting that there is no guarantee that it will be an easy task
to determine whether or not any given easy-argument is good or bad. I have bolstered
this point: the task is sometimes very difficult indeed. In short: easy ontology ain’t
easy.
With that said, I should come clean, and note that this does not contradict Thomas-
son’s official statement of easy ontology. In the careful formulations of her programme,
Thomasson explains that she is not using the word easy in its ordinary sense. Rather,
it is to be read in a ‘technical sense’, as a shorthand for the idea that ‘no epistemically
metaphysical work is required’ in answering existence questions.23 So, Thomasson
herself allows for the possibility that easy ontology can be time-consuming, compli-
cated, and so forth.
I shall revisit this idea of distinctively ‘epistemically metaphysical work’ in Sub-
sect. 4. Here, though, I shall simply offer three reasons—in increasing order of
importance—for why I have spent several pages explaining why, and how, easy ontol-
ogy ain’t easy.
First: even if the official formulations of a programme are careful, slogans and
brand names can be misleading. If they are not contested, then their rhetorical impact
can be hard to dislodge.
Second: Thomasson repeatedly describes the inferences in her favoured easy-
arguments as ‘trivial’.24 Unless ‘trivial’ is meant in a suitably technical sense, this
is wrong. The putative inferences to the existence of properties or propositions are
highly non-trivial, and even if they are ultimately legitimate inferences, this has yet to
be shown.
Third: the need for easy ontologists to invoke a Context Principle indicates a deep
connection between a self-consciously ‘neo-Carnapian’ approach to metaphysics, and
approaches that are more inspired by Frege.25 And I will crucially exploit that con-
nection in the next section.
To be clear, then: for everything I have said so far, it remains possible that existence
questions can and should be answered just by considering ordinary language. All I
have shown is that such answers are sometimes difficult to obtain, since they must
always take into account the Context Principle.
22 And if you doubt this, consider the classic exchange between Austin (1950) and Strawson (1950).
23 Thomasson (2015, p. 329), see also Thomasson (2015, pp. 17, 45n12, 113–4, 128–9, 158, 173, 204–5,
249, 270, 295, 319–21, 326–30).
24 Thomasson (2007, pp. 159, 162–3, 2009b, p. 6n8, 2013, pp. 1023, 1025–1030, 1033, 1036, 1038–1040,
1045, 1049, 2015, pp. 14, 21, 33–34, 39, 47–50, 56, 73, 111, 127–132, 134–135, 136–156, 159, 172–
173, 180, 191–196, 202–203, 205, 217, 219, 221, 229–232, 247, 251–254, 257, 273–276, 280, 282–284,
290–293, 296, 301, 318, 323, 2016, pp. 2, 7–8, 14, 16–17, forthcoming, pp. 1–16).
25 Thomasson (2015, pp. 132–145, forthcoming, Sect. 1) suggests that her easy ontology generalises several
other deflationary projects, including: Schiffer’s pleonastic platonism; Hale and Wright’s neo-Fregeanism;
and Blackburn’s and Price’s quasi-realism. She does not, though, discuss any version of a Context Principle.
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3 Mereology and ordinary usage
I now want to show, though, that there is no reason to hope that certain existence
questions can be settled just by considering ordinary language. In particular, I shall
take the debate surroundingmereology as a case study. This is significant, since almost
every metaphysical deflationist takes the mereology debate as their favourite example
of a supposedly pointless debate. To put the point crudely: since easy ontology cannot
even beat up the punchbag of contemporary metametaphysics, there is something
amiss with easy ontology.
3.1 An argument for universalism
Thomasson believes in ordinary composite objects, such as tables. Indeed, she is happy
to defend their existence via an easy-argument:26
(1m) these are particles arranged tablewise
(2m) this thing is a table
(3m) there are tables
(For what it is worth, I am sympathetic to the soundness of this argument. However,
given the discussion of Sect. 2, we should not expect that it will be easy to establish
its soundness. I will reinforce this point from Sect. 3.3 onwards.)
Thomasson, however, goes well beyond countenancing tables. Indeed, she main-
tains that easy ontologists should embrace mereological universalism (henceforth
simply universalism). I shall reconstruct her argument to this conclusion in five steps.27
Step 1. Consider the question: Which composite entities exist? One answer is:
Exactly those entities, for which we have simple words in ordinary English. Crudely,
the idea is that we can answer the question just by picking up a contemporary English
dictionary and highlighting all the nouns which are supposed to apply to composites.
But this answer—indeed this whole approach—seems much too parochial.28 We all
know that we could have spoken differently; indeed, that our dictionaries have changed
26 Thomasson raises two minor points about this argument which are well worth noting. First: since the
expression ‘particles arranged tablewise’ is a philosopher’s invention, (1m)–(3m) may well not qualify as
an argument of ordinary English. Nonetheless, the argument is dialectically appropriate in the context of
the mereology debate, and it may be offered in a suitable extension of ordinary English where all parties are
happy to use this new expression (see Thomasson 2015, pp. 106–107, 150). Moreover, had we preferred,
we could instead have considered (as an anonymous referee suggested) an argument in plain English such
as:
(1m′) he built a table
(2m′) there is a table which he built
(3m′) there are tables
Second: Thomasson does not need to provide an inference to (2m). Instead she could simply start with a
paradigm instance of (2m), as uttered in ordinary English perhaps while ostending a table (see Thomasson
2015, pp. 141–144). Nothing I say in criticism of Thomasson will exploit either point.
27 Particularly drawing on Thomasson (2007, pp. 183–185).
28 Thomasson (2015, pp. 214–215) claims that easy ontology pleasingly avoids parochialism.
123
Synthese
and will continue to change. The nouns we happen to have are just the ones we happen
to have.
Step 2. So consider any particles you like, arranged anyhow.We could, in principle,
add a word to our language—perhaps ‘gluggle’—to deal with exactly those particles,
arranged thathow. By such means, ‘gluggle’ would come to have perfectly reasonable
rules for use: encountering particles arranged ‘glugglewise’, we are to say ‘this thing
is a gluggle’. And, given the considerations of Step 1, it would be hopelessly parochial
to object that this is an illegitimate addition to our language.
Step 3. In future-speak, we will then have an easy-argument:
(1g) these are particles arranged glugglewise
(2g) this thing is a gluggle
(3g) there are gluggles
And, given that the argument (1m)–(3m) is good, so is the argument (1g)–(3g). To
think otherwise would, again, be horribly parochial. So we must accept that (3g) is
true in future-speak.29
Step 4. Observe that future-speak differs from present usage only by the addition of
the word ‘gluggle’ (and maybe ‘glugglewise’). This tiny alteration should not suffice
to change the meaning of the word ‘exists’. For if it did, then there would not be
enough stability in the word ‘exists’, over time and across vernaculars, to account for
communication. So we should accept that the word ‘exists’ has the same meaning in
future-speak as it does now. And, according to Thomasson, the ‘core rule’ for ‘exists’
is given as follows:
K s exist iff the application conditions actually associatedwith ‘K ’ are fulfilled.30
If the rule has not changed, then ‘K s exist’ is true (in future-speak) iff the (actual)
application conditions for the (future) word ‘K ’ are met. Since (3g) is to be true, we
can conclude that the entities which we shall call ‘gluggles’ exist (already).31
Step 5. But the word ‘gluggle’ was a schematic placeholder: we noted that any
particles, arranged anyhow, could be picked out by that word. So we conclude that
any particles, arranged anyhow, constitute an entity.32 And that is universalism.
29 In conversation, Teru Thomas raised the following interesting objection to this Step. Given the morals
of Sect. 2, we may not have introduced a sufficient range of uses of the word ‘gluggle’ for us to succeed in
successfully introduced a bona fide concept. Consequently, (1g)–(3g) might be a bad easy-argument, even
whilst (1m)–(3m) is good. There is much more to say here. However, I shall not pursue this point, except
to note that it once again illustrates just difficult easy ontology can be.
30 Thomasson (2015, p. 86). See also Thomasson (2008, pp. 64–67, 2009b, pp. 3–5, 2009a, pp. 453–454,
2015, pp. 83–89, 2016).
31 See Thomasson (2009b, p. 14, 2015, pp. 217–220).
32 Though I shall not pursue it in what follows, I am extremely suspicious of this inference. It is reasonable
to hold both that adding a single grain of sand to a non-heap never yields a heap, and that adding sufficiently
many grains of sand to a non-heap yields a heap. Similarly, then, it seems reasonable to hold both that
adding the word ‘gluggle’ to our vocabulary, together with the claim ‘there are gluggles’, does not shift the
meaning of ‘exists’, but that embracing universalism would involve a shift in the meaning of ‘exists’. My
point is simple: if meanings are objects, then they are as vague as heaps.
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3.2 Universalism and ordinary English
Something rather strange has happened: considerations concerning ordinary usage
have supposedly led us to embrace universalism. This extraordinary conclusion
demands investigation.
Thomasson is of course aware of the potential tension between advocating univer-
salism and focussing on ordinary usage. In an attempt to smooth it away, she writes:
it is true that common sense does not recognize the existence of [gluggles],
mereological sums, and the like. Nor, of course, does it deny their existence—
there are no terms in ordinary English for these things, and common sense
understandably does not consider such things at all….33
Thomasson maintains, then, that ordinary English speakers do not and could not deny
universalism, since they (currently) lack the vocabulary even to formulate universal-
ism.
Even if we grant Thomasson this point, the tension between her advocacy of univer-
salism and ordinary usage goes deeper than her reply suggests. As Peter van Inwagen
notes,34 universalism entails plenty of extraordinary claims which involve no mere-
ological vocabulary at all. To give us a working example, let the Two Table Room
contain what the untutored will describe as two wooden tables, both of which are
exactly 30kg, and nothing else. If universalism is right, then any arbitrary fusion of
table parts is itself an object. So, some scattering of parts from the two tables will
make it correct to say:
(m) something in the Two Table Room is exactly 51kg
This is a sentence of ordinary English. But it seems like an extraordinary thing to say.
I expect that most ordinary English speakers would reject (m), or be confused as to
why it has been said, or search in vain for some 51kg object. But Thomasson must
maintain that (m) is nevertheless true.
Evidently, Thomasson needs a theory to account for the slippage between what the
folk judge, andwhat she insists is true. Fortunately, she has a theory to hand.According
to Thomasson, we should distinguish at least two uses of existential quantification.35
Sometimes, we use the quantifier to pick out roughly contiguous objects, for example.
Read thus, (m) is clearly false: the table parts which would supposedly make it true are
diversely scattered. But there is also a ‘covering usage’ of existential quantification,
which licenses any transition from a successful application of a sortal term (e.g. ‘there
is a table in the Room’) to a sortally unqualified existential claim (e.g. ‘there is a
thing in the Room’). Read thus, Thomasson maintains that (m) is true. So, according
to Thomasson, (m) is true when read with a ‘covering usage’ of the quantifier, but
most speakers will reject (m) because they will tend to hear it with some other usage
in mind.
33 Thomasson (2007, p. 183).
34 van Inwagen (2009, pp. 49–50).
35 Thomasson (2009a, pp. 458–462).
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Unfortunately, if this proposal is to remove all conflict between ordinary usage
and universalism, then, for each mereological sum, there must be some ordinary sor-
tal which applies to the sum in question. For if the sortal is itself extraordinary—as
‘gluggle’ is—then ordinary English does not license the transition to a bare (sor-
tally unqualified) existential claim. And ordinary usage just does not have sufficiently
many sortals. (Of course, if ‘mereological sum’, or some synonym were a sortal of
ordinary English, then every sum would fall under some sortal. However, Thomasson
has already told us that ‘mereological sum’ is not a term of ordinary English; see the
quote at the start of this section.)
Thomasson has not, then, succeeded in removing the tension between ordinary
usage and universalism. But I should be clear: this does not show that universalism is
in conflict with the project of easy ontology itself. Perhaps there is some alternative
background theory which, all things considered, both offers the best underpinning for
ordinary English usage and also categorises (m) as true but extraordinary. That, in any
case, is what Thomasson must hope for.
3.3 Nihilism and ordinary usage
I shall not try to argue that there is no such theory. Instead, in this section, I shall
try to show the following: for any argument that ordinary usage pulls us towards
universalism, there is an exactly analogous argument that ordinary usage pulls us in
the opposite direction.
To show this, allow me to introduce a fictional philosopher, Nihal. Via reasoning
like Thomasson’s, Nihal has become convinced that ordinary usage pulls us towards
nihilism. Here is why.
Nihal agrees with Thomasson on most of the Steps in the argument of Subsect. 3.1.
Nihal warmly embraces Step 1: we cannot determine which composites exist, just by
considering the nouns we happen to have in English right now. For the same reason,
Nihal does not object at Step 2: no one can stop us from introducing a word, such as
‘gluggle’, to a language.
At Step 3, though, Nihal is more cautious. On pain of parochiality, Nihal agrees
that the arguments (1m)–(3m) and (1g)–(3g) stand or fall together. For now, though,
his commitment remains conditional.
At Step 4, Nihal agrees that adding theword ‘gluggle’ should not affect themeaning
of ‘exists’. So he commits to conditional: if the argument (1m)–(3m) is sound, then the
entities which we shall describe as ‘gluggles’ exist (already). And, wisely or not, Nihal
also concedes the force of Step 5. So he commits to the following: if the argument
(1m)–(3m) is sound, then universalism is true.
But Nihal rejects universalism. He is not concerned that it is too ontologically
profligate. He is not worried about issues concerning co-location. He has no fear of
large-scale causal redundancy.36 (So, Nihal’s reasoning is certainly not ‘epistemically
metaphysical’; see Subsect. 2.4, Sect. 4.) Rather, Nihal simply maintains that (m), and
many similar claims entailed by universalism, conflict with ordinary English utter-
36 Thomasson (2007) does an excellent job in rebutting these kinds of concerns.
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ances. So Nihal tollenses Thomasson’s ponens. He rejects the argument (1m)–(3m).
And since Nihal is opposed to parochialism, Nihal comes to deny that any composites
exist.
In sum: just as Thomasson affirms universalism, citing ordinary usage, so Nihal
affirms nihilism, citing ordinary usage.
Nihal is, of course, aware that nihilism is in tension with ordinary usage. To smooth
away the tension, he adopts van Inwagen’s ‘language of refuge’.37 He points out that
there is no harm in saying (2m), i.e. ‘this thing is a table’, so long as we understand
this as saying no more nor less than (1m), i.e. ‘these are particles arranged tablewise’.
(Compare this with the observation, from Subect. 2.2, that there is no harm in saying
‘rain put the kibosh on the cricket match’, if we understand this as saying ‘rain stopped
the cricket match’.) Indeed, Nihal continues, it may even be alright to affirm (3m),
i.e. ‘there are tables’, so long as it is understood similarly. (Compare this with the
observation, from Subsect. 2.3, that there is no harm in saying ‘there are kiboshes’, so
long as we understand this as saying ‘something stopped something’.)
Nihal’s only sticking point is this. When speaking strictly, Nihal will describe
the Two Table Room as follows: ‘there are some particles arranged tablewise with a
collective mass of 30kg, and some totally different particles arranged tablewise with
a collective mass of 30kg’. But when it comes to the existence question of whether
there are tables, and tables are singular composite entities, then, Nihal says: ‘there are
no tables’.
Nihal is mirroring Thomasson’s strategy from Subsect. 3.2. He sincerely wants
to respect ordinary English. He recognises conflict between nihilism and ordinary
English. And so, in an attempt to save the phenomena concerning what we ordinarily
say to each other—e.g. ‘there are two tables in the Room’—he offers a broad theory
which allows for this to be true, when heard in terms of particles arranged tablewise,
but strictly false when heard in terms of singular composites. (Compare this with
Thomasson’s suggestion that (m) is false, when the quantifiers are read in terms of
roughly contiguous objects, but true when read with a covering usage.)
Can no wedge be driven between Thomasson and Nihal? One might attempt to do
so, by insisting that it is clear that there are tables in the Two Table Room, but unclear
whether there is a 51kg thing in the Two Table Room.38 In that case, Nihal would
be clearly wrong, but it would be unclear that Thomasson is. But this line of thought
is question-begging, for two reasons. First, Nihal admits that he can hear a sense in
which ‘there are tables in the Two Table Room’ is (clearly) true; his point is just that
the sense in which it is true does not make contact with the relevant existence-question.
(Recall again, from Subsect. 2.3, that there is no harm in saying ‘there are kiboshes’,
so long as we understand this as saying ‘something stopped something’.) Second, all
of this ultimately depends upon empirical claims concerning what is clear (or not) to
ordinary English speakers. Until we have a survey of their attitudes to hand, neither
Thomasson nor Nihal can claim superiority here. But, even in the absence of a survey,
37 van Inwagen (1990, pp. 105, 109).
38 Anticipating the discussion of ‘customary rules for use’, below: this idea could be bolstered if we could
establish that the ‘customary rules for use’ governing ‘table’ are somehow clearer than those governing
‘thing’. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting I consider these responses.
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I am willing to stick my neck out and make a prediction:39 most of those ordinary
people who find it clear that there are tables in the Two Table Roomwill find it equally
clear that there is no 51kg thing there. Thomasson and Nihal are roughly as ‘clearly
wrong’ as each other.
For her part, Thomasson explicitly criticises a character like Nihal as follows:
the table-denier is not making any theoretic claim we can make sense of —since
if he accepted the term ‘table’ with its customary rules of use, it would be an
obvious truth that there are tables.40
But this complaint also fails to break the parity between Nihal and Thomasson. Nihal
can offer an exactly analogous complaint:
Thomasson is not making any theoretic claim we can make sense of —since if
she accepted ordinary words with their customary rules for use, it would be an
obvious truth that nothing in the Two Table Room is 51kg.
In fact, both Thomasson and Nihal are in danger of misleading us here. Nihal is a
fluent English speaker, and he understands that for a table to exist (strictly speaking)
is for there to be a composite object located exactly where some particles arranged
tablewise are. Nihal just denies that there are any composite objects. Thomasson is a
fluent English speaker, and she is familiar with standard means for measuring the mass
of medium-sized entities. She just thinks that weighing two tables simultaneously is
a method for weighing a single object,41 from which the weights of smaller (partially
overlapping) objects can be inferred. In short: both Thomasson and Nihal are familiar
with the relevant ‘customary rules of use’. The problem is that these ‘customary rules’
fail to decide between Thomasson’s or Nihal’s position.
Thomasson hints at a further consideration which might tell in her favour against
Nihal. She suggests that ‘normal’ people could easily be brought to assert the doctrine
of universalism, and so could equally be brought to assert (m):
suppose… that we explained to ‘normal’ people how the terms ‘[gluggle]’ and
‘sum of x and y’ were to be used…. Then simply ask them, for example, is there
a [gluggle]…? I think in this case ‘common sense’, with a vocabulary suitably
expanded to include the new term, would certainly accept that there is. (And
much the same, I think, would go for the case of sums, once the whole language
game of mereology was sufficiently introduced.)42
Now, I do not doubt that (most) people could be brought to speak in a way which led
them to affirm (m). But if this is break the parity between Thomasson and Nihal, then
we need some reason to think that (most) people could not equally be brought to speak
39 Note, though, that for reasons I shall develop in Subsect. 3.4, I would not mind if I were wrong about
this.
40 Thomasson (2016, p. 13); Thomasson’s italics. See also the references in footnote 2, above.
41 cf. Thomasson’s (2007, p. 154) remark that the way to own a pair of gloves is just to own a left-glove
and a right-glove which match.
42 Thomasson (2007, p. 184).
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Nihal’s way; to adopt the language of refuge. And no such reason is forthcoming. Both
ways of speaking are equally available.
We could keep going, but my point should be clear by now. Nihal can and will
shadow Thomasson’s every move. As such, Thomasson and Nihal’s positions seem
on a par: both advocate positions that involve some conflict with ordinary language,
and nothing obviously tells between them. Now, I do not claim to have an shown that
it is in principle impossible for Thomasson to triumph over Nihal, or vice versa, on the
basis of considerations drawn solely from ordinary language.My point is just that there
is no obvious reason to believe (or even to hope) that one of these two incompatible
positions will win out over the other.
To be sure, there is a difference between Thomasson and Nihal. But it seems to
come down only to this. Thomasson prefers to countenance hitherto-unrecognised
entities (e.g. of arbitrary fusions), where Nihal prefers to retract positive affirmations
of existence (e.g. of tables).Andonemight reasonablyworry that this ismere prejudice,
on both their parts.
Indeed, this worry can be bolstered by reaching back to the Context Principle, as
raised in Subsect. 2.2. In defence of her position, Thomasson cites her favoured theory
of reference which, she claims, ‘underpins’ ordinary usage. According to this theory,
K s exist iff the application conditions for ‘K ’ are fulfilled. And, she maintains, the
application conditions for ‘table’ and ‘gluggles’ are equally fulfilled, so that there is
nothing more to say. But the preceding discussion indicates that there is more to say.
As shown in Subsect. 2, to determine whether an easy-argument is good or bad—to
determine, that is, whether we may infer that something exists—we must invoke the
Context Principle. Otherwise put, if we are to determine whether there is a genuine
term in the offing, then we must consider rich, widespread patterns of usage. But this
means that there is no reason to followThomasson in veneratingmere ‘applications’ of
a concept—i.e. utterances of the form ‘that is a K ’—when we come to decide what to
count as a true answer to an existence question. Indeed, there is no reason to venerate
utterances of any particular form. Rather, we must consider all the ways in which a
particular (putative) term can be used, as discussed in Subsect. 2.2. But, having done
so, there is no neutral reason to insist that our initial endorsement of (2m) should
‘trump’ our initial rejection of (m), as Thomasson does, or vice versa, as Nihal does.
In sum: the Context Principle ultimately puts the kibosh on any attempt to argue for
either universalism or nihilism via easy ontology.
3.4 Parochialism and ordinary usage
I nowwant to move beyond universalism and nihilism, and consider a third alternative,
which claims—mistakenly—to be more respectful to ordinary language.
In Subsect. 3.3, we considered Thomasson’s suggestion that wemight coach people
in the language of ‘gluggles’ and ‘sums’. She offered this as a way to make sense of
the semantics of ordinary English; to make us see that (m) was really true all along,
when heard the right way. I also noted that Nihal could suggest a similar coaching
in the ‘language of refuge’. But one might well take issue with the idea that this
‘coaching’ tells us anything about ordinary English. Instead, one might think that the
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process of ‘coaching’ amounts to teaching ordinary English speakers how to speak a
new language, which is related to but distinct from ordinary English.
This is the line of thought advanced by Eli Hirsch. Like Thomasson, Hirsch
describes himself as a neo-Carnapian who thinks that existence questions are to be
settled by considerations of ordinary usage (if at all). But Hirsch holds that both
Thomasson and Nihal are attempting to abandon ordinary English in favour of new
ways of speaking. According to Hirsch, ordinary English embraces the existence of
‘ordinary’ objects, and so rejects nihilism, but it equally rejects (m), and so rejects
universalism.43
Hirsch, then, presents us with an alternative to both universalism and nihilism:
stick, resolutely, to the ontology of ordinary English. In terms of the above, Hirsch
effectively gets off the bus at Step 1 of the argument in Subsect. 3.1. That is, Hirsch
is prepared to shrug off the accusation of parochiality. Consequently, I shall call his
position parochialism.
In calling it parochialism, I am not cocking a snook at Hirsch. Ordinary usage
enables us to copewith ordinary situations: predicamentswhichwe actually encounter,
to which we must respond. Ordinary usage is well-suited to this purpose, and this is no
coincidence: had it been ill-suited, a better-suited usage would likely have sprung up in
its place. Given its suitability for purpose, though, it is unclear whywe should care that
it is parochial. To be sure, if we wanted to determine what really and fundamentally
exists, say, then the charge of parochiality would cut deep. But, if our aim was simply
to cope with ordinary situations, then an accusation of parochiality will be no big
bananas.
For the purposes of this paper, the important question is whether easy ontologists
should embrace parochialism. The considerations of the previous paragraph might
seem to support the idea that they should. After all, opposition to parochialism is a
completely standard move in ‘traditional’ metaphysics. So, when Thomasson pitched
easy ontology against parochialism in Step 1 of Subsect. 3.1, perhaps she embraced
too much of ‘traditional’ metaphysics.
Certainly, parochialism a reasonable deflationary option. But parochialism is no
more the unique way to pursue ordinary usage than is universalism or nihilism. To see
why, I shall consider the parochialist’s attempt to answer the question: What exists?
The parochialist will begin by saying that we must answer this question by appeal-
ing to ordinary usage. But that is not yet an answer. At best, it is the slogan of a
methodology. To answer the question, the parochialist must determine what ordinary
speakers actually say.
Now, in Subsect. 3.1, I crudely caricatured the parochialist as attempting to
answer the question by flicking through a contemporary English dictionary. Even
the parochialist will regard this as overly crude. Dictionaries get out of date; they
straddle an interesting divide between descriptive and prescriptive uses of language;
and, fundamentally, one can always ask whether or not the dictionary was compiled
43 See Hirsch (2002, pp. 60–70, 2005, pp. 85–90, 2009, pp. 238–242).
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correctly.44 And all of these points bring us right back to the original question for the
parochialist: what do ordinary speakers actually say?
The parochialist would do better, then, to conduct a thorough survey of ordinary
English speakers. So, suppose the parochialist presents ordinary speakerswithmultiple
questions of the form ‘are there s?’. For simplicity, we shall suppose that this survey
is conducted absolutely impeccably. By aggregating the answers, we might attempt to
generate ‘the ordinary theory of what exists’. Call this the Questionnaire Theory.
The results of the survey might well supply us with some interesting linguistic data.
But when it comes to the matter of existence questions, the Questionnaire Theory is
entirely useless. To illustrate its problems, consider these three incompatible claims:
(a) there are K s
(b) if there are K s, then there are Ls
(c) there are no Ls
It is entirely possible for amajority of people to affirm (a), amajority of people to affirm
(b), and amajority of people to affirm (c),without anyonemaking an elementary logical
mistake. And this situation is more than a merely abstract possibility; it is concretely
realised by the three positions which I have considered in this section. Read ‘K s’ as
‘tables’ and ‘Ls’ as ‘entities which we shall refer to as “gluggles”’. Thomasson affirms
(a) and (b), and so rejects (c). Nihal affirms (b) and (c), and so rejects (a). Hirsch affirms
(a) and (c), and so presumably rejects (b). So, if the views of Thomasson, Nihal and
Hirsch are equally represented in the population, then the Questionnaire Theory will
have no internal coherence. It will be nothing but a list of words, for which a majority
of people are prepared to say ‘there are s’. To call that a theory of what exists is to
give it an honorific it just does not deserve.
3.5 Philosophy and tension
In this particular case, the parochialist might maintain that Thomasson and Nihal are
victims of philosophical errors, which have caused them to abandon ordinary usage.
But that would be a glib response to a deep problem. The deep problem is that ordinary
usage is subject to a certain amount of tension; tensionwhich theQuestionnaire Theory
cannot even acknowledge.
A basic philosophical experience is to be pulled in different directions by your
‘ordinary’ commitments. Some of these tensions can be brought out with nothing
more than a pair of well-posed questions, whilst others take years of thought to expose.
We encounter these tensions when we first read a Socratic dialogue; again when we
are taught philosophy; still further when we teach it; and at every stage of honest
reflection. So, for any given area of philosophical controversy, we should expect that
our ‘ordinary’ usage will be subject to tensions which push us in different directions,
and which undermine the idea that we could read a theory off from ordinary usage.
Different people break in different directions in response to that tension. That, indeed,
is how the (a)–(b)–(c) problem can even get started.
44 Cf. Quine (1951, p. 24).
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Focussing on the particular case of mereology: the parochialist cannot legiti-
mately maintain that she has remained philosophically innocent, or deliberately
un-philosophical, whilst Thomasson and Nihal have been led astray by philosophical
theorising. Looked at from the outside, we should say that all three parties have made
different philosophical decisions in response to the latent tensions present in ordinary
usage. Within ordinary usage, there is an undeniable pressure against parochialism
towards either universalism or nihilism, as discussed during Step 1 of Subsect. 3.1.
Equally, though, there is pressure against both universalism and nihilism, and hence
back to parochialism. Of course, we can attempt to shrug off some of these pressures.
But to do that is, as metaphysicians have always said, to ‘bite a bullet’. How big a
bullet was bitten? Well, that will vary from case to case. But just such questions are
the bread and butter of ‘traditional’ metaphysics.
To round off this section, I shall link these thoughts back to the Context Principle
of Sect. 2 once again. I have argued that, insofar as we can speak of ‘the ontological
commitments of ordinary usage’, they must be determined by considering large-scale
patterns of usage. But, as just noted, the entire experience of doing philosophy confirms
that large-scale patterns of usage are typically shot through with tensions. So, if you
are insistent on determining ‘the ontological commitments of ordinary usage’, you
cannot simply conduct a parochial survey of ordinary usage; not even one which does
more than merely asking a bunch of questions of the form ‘are there s?’ You must
immerse yourself in a practice, and learn to feel its tensions, as its practitioners do.
And then you must decide how to react to those tensions: to live with them, or to
resolve them in one way, or to dissolve them in another. The decision can be taken
explicitly or implicitly; through action or inaction. But these are different decisions,
and there is no a priori reason to expect that one of them must be uniquely the right
decision.
4 The role of ordinary language
We cannot, then, expect analysis of ordinary language to provide us with a catch-all
method for avoiding the standard questions of metaphysics. Nevertheless, a central
pillar of Thomasson’s easy ontology remains untouched by the discussion so far. For
nothing I have yet said contradicts her claim that we will never need to undertake
distinctively ‘epistemically metaphysical work’ (see Subsect. 2.4). I shall close this
paper by assessing this idea.
Contemporary metaphysics sometimes employs notions which I must confess I
struggle to understand: in virtue of ; fundamental; grounding; truth-making; joint-
carving; natural; and so forth. Moreover, sometimes—though not always—these
rather intractable notions are wielded in a way which makes metaphysics deliberately
discontinuous from other concerns and areas of inquiry. Now, insofar as Thomasson
is exhorting us to avoid philosophising in this way, I agree with her wholeheartedly.45
However, there is a large gap between rejecting that way of philosophising, and signing
up to Thomasson’s project.
45 See e.g. Thomasson (2009a, pp. 295–317) and Button (2013, pp. 1, 177).
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In a deeply insightful passage, Thomasson suggests that deflationary approaches
should ‘renounce the search for reductive generalizations of the following form’:
K s exist iff
and she considers and rejects various past proposals for cashing out this biconditional,
e.g., iff: K s are causally potent; K s are mind-independent; K s are posits of our best
scientific theory; K s posses a real nature; etc.46 The desirability of such a reductive
generalization is clear: crudely put, it would turn ontology into a craft comparable
with plumbing.47 Rather than endlessly pontificating about whether and how one
might even in principle solve certain problems, the reductive generalisation would
equip us with some general tools and methods for actually solving those problems.
Moreover, these methods would be tractable, but—like plumbing—probably best left
to professionals.
I agree with Thomasson that this conception of ontology is—for better or worse—
fantastical. But, ultimately, Thomasson herself falls victim to a variant of it, when she
provides her own generalization:
K s exist iff the application conditions actually associatedwith ‘K ’ are fulfilled.48
Thomasson regards her biconditional as importantly ‘insubstantial’, on the grounds
that it is metalinguistic (contrast this with the reductive generalisations considered and
rejected in the previous paragraph). Butmy concernwith such reductive biconditionals
is not with their ‘substantiality’, but with their ambition of turning ontology into a craft
comparable with plumbing. Armed with the easy ontologist’s biconditional, existence
questions remain finicky enough to keep us in a trade, for reasons outlined in Sects. 2–
3, but tractable enough to be settled by restricting your attention to the analysis of
ordinary language. This is just the image I find untenable.
In Subsect. 3.5, I commented that ‘traditional’ metaphysical questions can easily
be motivated by attempts to resolve the implicit tensions in ordinary language. In
fact, there are plenty of other sources of tension. Tensions arise from all sorts of our
commitments, be they ordinary or scientific, mathematical or political, aesthetic or
poetic, religious or ethical, or—often—some combination of all of these. Indeed, I
am not really going out on a limb when I say: If there were no such tensions, then
philosophy would not exist.
As in Subsect. 3.5, then, but with more potential sources of tension in play: it is
a philosophical decision to live with those tensions; it is a different philosophical
decision to attempt to relieve them; and we should not expect that there is a uniquely
best way to relieve them. But crucially, since these tensions may be drawn from any
areas of consequence (and not just from ordinary language), we should expect to have
to answer questions which arise from any areas of consequence, or from their mutual
interaction (and not just questions which arise from analysis of ordinary language).
46 See Thomasson (2015, pp. 88, 116).
47 To adopt an image which I think I took from Hugh Mellor (but neither of us is sure).
48 See footnote 30.
123
Synthese
At its best, metaphysics just is the attempt to answer such questions, in an attempt to
relieve such tensions, whatever their sources.49
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
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